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Reviewed by Amy Widman 
In a county courthouse in Grand Marais, Minnesota, there hangs a framed 
corduroy jacket. This jacket was worn by a public defender named James 
Sommerness, a lawyer who practiced in this courthouse for decades. Known 
for his informality of dress, the memorial is a celebration of access. It is also 
seemingly unique among courthouse plaques in its confrontation of the reality 
that resources can affect justice and the corresponding need to provide legal 
assistance to the poor (372-75).
This is one of the many stories of how we celebrate and perceive the role of 
courts throughout the world in Representing Justice, by Judith Resnik and Dennis 
Curtis. The book contains an extensive collection of images alongside its text 
and is a visual treat, rare among works of legal academia. But beyond the 
art historical contributions provided by tracing images of justice throughout 
time and geography lies a deeply relevant exploration of the role of courts in 
a democracy and contemporary threats against both institutions. The book’s 
main premise treats justice, and specifically the development of the modern 
court system, as part of a triptych (alongside the postal service and the press) 
of modern developments that sustain democratic governance. These three 
developments share the commonality of communication, and so it is through 
communication that democracy is sustained. As Jeremy Bentham put it, courts, 
the press, and the postal service created a “tribunal of public opinion” (14).1 All 
three developments are currently facing profound structural challenges (335-
36).2
Drawing on recurring themes of participation, voice, the power of public 
perception, and access to courts, the authors catalog visual portrayals of 
1. Citing Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code in 9 The Works of Jeremy BenTham 41 (John 
Bowring, ed., 1843) and frederick rosen, Jeremy BenTham and represenTaTive 
democracy: a sTudy of The consTiTuTional code 26-27 (1983).
2. Citing Jody freeman & marTha minoW, GovernmenT By conTracT: ouTsourcinG and 
american democracy (2009).
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justice in courthouse settings around the world in order to explore various 
understandings of the role of law in society. By examining the architecture 
and iconography of justice over time, the authors trace the evolution of the 
judiciary and judicial process as becoming a governmental role of necessary 
transparency. The authors describe this development as a metamorphosis of 
“rites” into “rights” (288-305). The public’s participation and education in the 
judgment process, through open courts, through a focus on reason-giving, 
and the obligation of hearing both sides, flourishes alongside the creation 
of an independent judiciary. The court, with its attendant role of dispensing 
justice, over time became a place of communication by and for the people and 
a constraint on governmental authority.  
But this is not the end of the story, and Resnik and Curtis offer a narrative 
that is also critical. How does the visual representation of Justice, seen 
throughout the world, capture these democratic developments? Can Justice 
as a virtue stand alone? What happened to her sister virtues from Renaissance 
times and the cohort of Justice with Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude? 
Why did Justice survive into modern translations and renderings while the 
other three fell off?  
The authors posit that Justice survived and thrived as a legitimizing aspect 
of state power (7, 8). In this way, Justice gave a stamp of legitimacy to the 
state in its judgments; she became a valuable marketing tool, so to speak.3 
The authors question the role of this iconography:  Should governments only 
uphold lofty portrayals of Justice; does the representation of justice do more 
than signify legitimacy? Does the visual silence regarding the more difficult 
problem of representation’s relationship to power undermine the democratic 
value of the court system?  
In this spirit the authors continue to unpack the marketing of Justice, asking 
whether it is consistent with society’s current valuing of justice. Are the visual 
signals in line with a system aiming to afford access for all people? Have the 
democratic values of open courts and information dissemination been realized 
or co-opted through marketing campaigns and sensationalism, causing justice 
to bend toward public perception rather than evidence and facts in a particular 
case? Does the iconography of Justice in our courthouses and popular culture 
have a role to play in this disconnect? The authors give equal time to exploring 
these tensions as well, suggesting that in order to sustain a democracy, the 
architecture and iconography must address the dark side of justice’s past, too.
3. For more on how marketing shapes the development of legal norms, see, e.g., John a. 
Quelch & kaTherine e. Jocz, GreaTer Good: hoW Good markeTinG makes for 
BeTTer democracy (2007); Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: 
How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 397 (2006) (examining 
criminal law doctrinal developments); Jane Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive 
Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 Yale L.J. 107 (1995) (examining literature used to promote 
ballot initiatives); Amy Widman, The Rostrum Principle: Why the Boundaries of the Public Forum Matter 
to Statutory Interpretation, 65 fla. l. rev. 1447 (2013) (suggesting that the public marketing of 
legislation be applied toward its subsequent interpretation).
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In order for justice to enhance democracy, it also must reflect the people. 
Describing how popular resistance to culturally insensitive representations 
of justice in court buildings reflects the public’s ongoing dialogue with 
imagery, the authors also note how rare it is for Justice to appear other than 
as the traditional white woman with a blindfold. Their exhaustive catalog of 
representations of Justice in governmental buildings around the world reveals 
merely one depiction of Justice as a woman of color that remains in plain view 
(121).4 How does Justice translate as a democratic ideal when it is not reflective 
of the people who will be judged?  
The institutional architecture of courthouses also speaks to the dominance 
of power and the status quo, which can be in tension with access and openness.
In America, a twentieth-century building boom produced large centralized 
buildings housing courts, impressively enshrined and stable (154-168). This 
time period coincided with an expansion of the role of courts in protecting 
rights, the birth of a Legal Services Corporation to provide representation 
to those who could not afford a lawyer, and the development of a cohesive 
procedural law built on ideas of access. Thus we see a democratically developed 
body of law focusing on rights and access to be judged inside buildings 
designed to be monumental, central, and stable. In contrast, we see early 
twenty-first-century buildings focusing on different themes:  security, isolation 
of judges from the public by enlarging private chambers and assigning judges 
to particular courtrooms, and less adjudication generally taking place in the 
courthouse buildings. Art has long been a feature of these types of buildings, 
but provocative representations of justice are often quietly provocative, if 
present at all. The authors examine recent installations in courthouses by 
artists like Tom Otterness and Jenny Holzer for their questioning of how well 
justice currently meets its ideal (184-191). But these works are referential and 
require background knowledge that might reduce their potency, features that 
the artists imply might also have been by design.5 
Is Justice under threat as a virtue and, correspondingly, are the courts 
threatened alongside the vulnerabilities currently being experienced by the 
press and the postal service? The twenty-first century is uncovering a widening 
gap between the lofty ideals and architecture of the court system and the 
modern development and evolving doctrine of our courts.
Turning toward privatization models of justice, like various forms of 
arbitration and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as the 
4. The 1993 statue of Justice at the entry of the federal courthouse in St. Croix in the Virgin 
Islands remains in full view. However, the authors reveal that even this depiction is a 
compromise from the original statue proposed, a nine-foot-tall depiction of Justice as a 
“Moco Jumbie,” an African folklore figure (121-124). The authors also tell the story of a 
1937 mural in a South Carolina federal courthouse that drew controversy for its portrayal of 
Justice as a “mulatto” woman, and eventually was hidden behind a velvet curtain (110-113).
5. The installations examined are Law of Nature, by Tom Otterness, a group of small sculptures 
on a terrace of the federal courthouse in Portland, Oregon; and Installation for the Sacramento 
Courthouse, by Jenny Holzer, a series of 99 engravings of quotations on granite pavers in the 
federal courthouse in Sacramento, California (184-191).
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siphoning off of many cases into administrative adjudications, the authors 
continue to explore the architecture of such alternative dispute settings while 
questioning the values portrayed and reinforced by these shifts. For example, 
administrative adjudications occur in nondescript offices, without the grace and 
lofty architecture and art supporting an institutional commitment to Justice as 
a virtue. Such adjudication proceedings are often hard to find; the proceedings 
themselves contain fewer procedural protections, and there is correspondingly 
less access to the decisions (317-318)6 Similar themes of restricted information 
and access abound in mandatory arbitration proceedings, which are premised 
upon confidentiality as a tool to promote open discussion—it is thought 
that confidentiality is needed to resolve disputes in these forums.7 This has 
the effect of removing the more mundane dispensations of justice from the 
public sphere, a move the authors posit weakens norm development and 
public education of adjudication’s role in a democracy, and which ultimately 
undermines the democratic nature of the court system entirely. Although the 
architecture of most modern courthouses aspires to signal permanence and 
importance, the authors point to similar institutions, with grand architecture 
and nods toward institutional permanence (the postal service and the press, 
of course, but also schools, the military, and prisons) as harbingers of what 
might befall courts in the twenty-first century—a privatization that brings with 
it a strong blow to democracy and access (336).8 It is the behavior of the courts 
in the everyday matters that most truly represents its democracy, and threats 
to remove the role of courts in these more routine matters under the guise of 
efficiency strike to the heart of this value.
It’s not only the more mundane dispensations of justice that are being 
removed from Bentham’s tribunal of public opinion, however. The authors 
include “Camp Justice” at Guantanamo Bay as another compelling instance 
of the visual marketing of justice, portrayed in this case by glimpses of 
individuals branded terrorists through barbed wire surrounding the detention 
facility and images of rooms modeled after typical courtrooms (328-331). These 
visual cues of justice, their portrayals of criminality and process, stood a vast 
distance from the reality of the tribunals at Guantanamo, which turned away 
from modern developments of courts as open and independent and as valuing 
both sides of the dispute.9 While many have claimed that Guantanamo and 
its processes were isolated examples, the authors’ main point is that courts are 
6. See, e.g., Christopher B. McNeil, The Public’s Right of Access to “Some Kind of Hearing”: Creating Policies 
that Protect the Right to Observe Agency Hearings, 68 la. l. rev. 1121 (2008) (discussing generally 
the procedural differences between court trials and administrative adjudications, especially 
procedures for creating access and participation).
7. Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 kan. l. rev. 1255 (2006) 
(offering a descriptive and normative analysis of confidentiality policies in arbitration).
8. See freeman & minoW, supra note 2.
9. See, e.g., Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedure and Long-Term Executive Detention, 
86 Denver U. L. rev. 961, 989 (2009) (describing in detail why “[t]he story of Guantanamo 
is the story of a failure of process.”).
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made up of many isolated practices and procedures and must function openly 
both to safeguard the litigants’ rights and also to allow for continuous public 
evaluation and education of the development of legal norms. In this sense, the 
authors group Guantanamo alongside the other examples of privatization and 
administrative adjudication as developments that together serve to weaken 
adjudication’s role in democracy.
Switching from a historical focus, the authors begin to sketch what a 
“democratic iconography” of courts might look like, focusing both on 
architecture and function. First, there must be room in the new iconography 
for an accessible discussion of oppression and recognition of the possibility 
of injustice. An honest representation of the powerless can have great ripple 
effects in advancing the dominant understanding of courts, like the building 
of the South African Constitutional Court on the remnants of the jail that 
held many of Apartheid’s resistors (350-356). On a more pragmatic level, they 
advocate for the inclusion of social spaces in courthouses—here the authors 
point to courthouses with educational programs, lecture spaces, and even 
performance venues—as having both architectural and functional significance 
to the development of democracy, expressing value to the public fitting for a 
democratic house. Specialized courts with their attendant programs conjoined 
(like family courts with spaces for social workers, children’s play spaces, and 
other services relevant to the issues facing family court litigants) (343) also 
exemplify a renewed focus on a  democratically focused role for courts. The 
architecture itself removes the resonating theme of punishment and instead 
projects a more integrated government service.10
The authors circle back to Justice as a virtue ultimately, concluding that by 
cutting Justice off from her sister virtues, virtues that can bring an iconography 
of humility, reflection, and other less celebrated aspects of judging, we may 
have become myopic in our view of the role of the courts. The tattered corduroy 
jacket hanging in the county courthouse symbolizes a more honest image of 
Justice, one to which we should aspire. Rather than merely a blindfold and 
a scale, the jacket incorporates humility and humanity, bringing Justice into 
truly full relief.
Professors Resnik and Curtis have charted a visually impressive and deeply 
thought-provoking course through the art and architecture surrounding 
justice as well as a history of the development of justice in popular opinion 
and ultimately as a backbone of democracy. What’s more, they pose 
challenging questions about the future of both justice and the court system. 
Their point, that the future can be altered through a critical understanding of 
the iconography and architecture surrounding our legal system, is ultimately 
an inspiring one. While themes common to law professors and other legal 
scholars echo throughout—the importance of transparency, accountability, 
voice, and participation in law and representations of the legal system—the 
10. Along these lines, the authors discuss the use of glass as a building material (341-42). Glass 
has obvious resonance of transparency, but also can signal more punitive associations, like 
surveillance.
353Book Review: Representing  Justice
presentation of these themes in a comprehensive art history is innovative and 
enlightening. The subject matter transcends legal academia as well. Political 
philosophers, art historians, cultural critics, and all those with a deep interest 
in the role architecture and art can play in shaping democracy will find much 
delight and insight in Representing Justice. And we can all take inspiration from 
the idea that law is dynamic and that the people play a role in shaping what 
happens to justice, and our courts, as we seek greater understandings of how 
law is marketed to us, how law is seen and experienced by those in power and 
by the powerless, and how the public needs to be able to interact with law to 
keep it democratic.
